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A VALUE-ADDED RANKING OF LAW SCHOOLS
ChristopherJ Ryan, Jr.
Abstract
Before and since the first publication of the U.S. News & World
Report (hereinafter "U.S. News") ranking of law schools, legal education
has been characterized by competition. As the first mover in the ranking
of law schools, the U.S. News rankings have changed the landscape of
legal education. Not only do law students measure the worth of law
schools based on these rankings, but law schools react to the categories
favored by these rankings' methodology in order to bolster their position
relative to their peers. This fixation on one ranking may foment the
progress of legal education toward providing quantifiable value to current
and prospective students.
This Article proffers evidence of the relative time invariance of the
U.S. News law school rankings, assesses alternative ranking systems, and
proposes a value-added ranking of law schools. The value-added rankings
represent an outcomes-based movement, in standard deviations, from
where a law school is predicted to be, based on its students' credentials
upon entry to law school, to the space it actually occupies, given those
same students upon their graduation from law school. This value-added
ranking, in essence, measures the effect of attending the law school. The
law school value-added measures deviate significantly from existing
ranking systems of law schools and suggest that traditional notions of law
schools' value ought to be reassessed under this new framework.
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INTRODUCTION

For decades, law schools have been characterized by competition.
Law students-the consumers of legal education-first encounter this
competition in the form of rigorous admissions standards to enter law
school.' Once in law school, law students face competition in greater
doses, notably: rivalry among students vying for top grades, law
review editorial posts, summer job placement, bar passaged and
ultimately, the adversarial nature of the legal profession. For
members of the legal academy and administration-the providers of
legal education-competition for law faculty jobs, research output,
and institutional prestige predominates. 3 The contest for institutional
prestige in which providers of legal education are engaged also
impacts consumers of legal education by the competition among law
schools to admit the best possible law students to attend their law
school, perhaps even when doing so may result in unethical admission
practices.4 Thus, competition has become a fixture in the legal
academic market and inevitably inures to ranking market participants
on the basis of their value.
Since the first publication of the U.S. News & World Report
(hereinafter "US. News") rankings of national law schools in 1987,
critics and apologists of the ranking system alike have acknowledged the
importance of the rankings in shaping the legal education environment
during its boom and bust in the 21st Century.5 The groundswell of
1. See, e.g., Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School
Admissions: What Do Racial PreferencesDo?, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 649, 662-63 (2008) (discussing
competitive admissions at law schools).
2. See, e.g., William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured
byLSATScores: MigrationPatternsin the U.S. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L. J. 163, 168 (2006)
(analyzing competition in admissions and among law students upon admission to law school).
3. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Labor Marketfor New Law Professors, II J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 19-36 (2014); Richard E. Redding, "Where Did You Go to Law

School?": Gatekeepingfor the Professoriate and Its Implicationsfor Legal Education, 53 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 594, 605-06 (2003).
4. Andrew Wolfson, Former University ofLouisville Admissions Directorto Pay $25,000
in Restitution for Offering Bogus Law Scholarships, COURIER-J. (Feb. 10, 2014, 6:37 PM),
http://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/crime/2014/02/1 0/former-university-of-louisvilleadmissions-director-to-pay-25000-restitution-for-offering-bogus-law-scholarships/5376555/
(detailing a law school's unethical admissions practices). But see Ry Rivard, Lowering the Bar:
More Law Schools Are Admitting Less Qualified Students, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 16, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/16/law-schools-compete-students-many-maynot-have-admitted-past.
5. See Louis H. Pollak, Why Trying to Rank Law Schools Numerically is a Non-Productive
Undertaking:An Article on the U.S. News & World Report 2009 List of the Top 100 Schools, 1
DREXEL L. REv. 52, 61-65 (2009) (advocating against the U.S. News rankings while
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competition for improved standing in the U.S. News rankings coincided
with a historic rise in law school applicants, students, and graduates in
the early 2000s. 6 However, as law school enrollment has declined
precipitously in the last decade, a renewed conversation about the value
of law school-and the reliability of the U.S. News' ranking of law
schools-has arisen.
This Article examines current rankings of law schools and extends the
conversation about the appropriate measures of value of legal education.
Part I of this Article reviews the U.S. News rankings of law schools and
alternative ranking systems of law schools in addition to looking to other
literatures that seek to quantify the value of education. Part II explains
the methodology used to rank law schools by the value they add to their
students. Part III presents the findings of such a ranking.
I. RANKING LAW SCHOOLS

A. The Permanence ofthe U.S. News Rankings
The U.S. News rankings are integral to understanding the current
environment for legal education, because for better or for worse, the U.S.
News rankings have become the "gold standard of the ranking business,"
as well as a proxy for determining a law school's quality and value. 7 A
recent survey of current law students, which asked what sources of
information upon which law students relied to make their decision to
acknowledging their ubiquity); Brian Leiter, How to Rank Law Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 47, 50-51
(2006) (suggesting a faculty performance ranking of law schools as an alternative to the U.S. News
rankings); Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure
Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L. J. 83, 83-136 (2006) (noting the lasting effect of the U.S. News
rankings while utilizing an alternative rankings methodology similar to Brian Leiter's
methodology, which has subsequently been employed by researchers, such as Michael Yelnosky,
et al., to rank law schools on the basis of faculty productivity); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The
Destructionof the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The PerniciousEffects of Rankings, 81 IND.
L. J. 309, 311-18 (2006); see also Russell Korobkin, Harnessingthe Positive Power ofRankings:
A Response to Posner and Sunstein, 81 INo. L. J. 35, 35, 40-45 (2006); Paul L. Caron & Rafael
Gely, What Law Schools Can Learnfrom Billy Beane and the OaklandAthletics, 82 TEx. L. REV.

1483, 1509-21 (2004); Nancy B. Rapoport, Ratings, Not Rankings: Why U.S. News & World
Report Shouldn 't Want to Be Compared to Time and Newsweek-or The New Yorker, 60 OHIO

ST. L. J. 1097, 1098-99 (1999).
6. See Caron & Gely, supra note 5, at 1510; Jeffrey E. Stake, The Interplay between Law
School Rankings, Reputations, and Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L. J.
229 (2006); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Reachingfor the Brass Ring: The U.S. News & World Report
Rankings and Competition, 26 THE REV. OF HIGHER EDUC. 145, 146-47 (2002).
7. Robert L. Jones, A Longitudinal Analysis of the U.S. News Law School Academic
Reputation Scores between 1998 and 2013, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 721, 722-23 (2013);
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson, Enduring Hierarchiesin
American Legal Education, 89 IND. L.J. 941, 944 (2014); Ehrenberg, supra note 6, at 146; see
George Critchlow, Kim Kardashianand Honey Boo Boo: Models for Law School Success (or

Not), 45 CONN. L. REv. 1319, 1330 (2013).
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attend their current law school, indicated that 93.85% of students at an
elite private law school, 77.01% of students at a public flagship law
school, 57.58% of students at a public regional law school, and 61.36%
of students at a private law school relied on the U.S. News rankings as a
factor of primary consideration when deciding to attend their current law
school.8 In other words, the salience of the US. News rankings is very
high for law students across a variety of law school typologies and among
all reputational tiers of law schools as ranked by the US. News. 9
Despite re-weighting by the publication in an effort to revise and
refine its measurements over the last three decades, the US. News
rankings are relatively stable and are based on a composite score of
several variables.10 Since 2000, each law school's composite score has
been summed from four discrete institutional characteristics: (1) quality
of matriculated students, which includes median undergraduate grade
point average (GPA), median Law School Admissions Test (LSAT)
scores, and acceptance rates; (2) reputational quality, which is derived,
controversially, from a peer review survey of deans, professors, judges,
and lawyers; (3) school resources, which are operationalized from
variables such as student-faculty ratio, per student expenditure, and
library volumes; and (4) post-raduation outcomes, which include bar
passage and employment rates.
Critics have attributed the virtual ubiquity of the U.S. News rankings
to a new fixation on the relative standings of law schools by stakeholders
both inside and outside of legal academe and have attacked the US. News
methodology-whose reputational "quality assessment" survey accounts
for forty percent of a law school's total score-as both a product and a
source of stagnation in legal education.1 2 The latter criticism, often
referenced by its positive externalities as the "Pygmalion Effect," or by
its negative externalities as the "Golem Effect," has been termed in the

8. These results are from the Law School Choice survey, which was conducted by the

author. Full results are forthcoming. See Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., Analyzing Law School Choice,
2020 ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
9. Id.
10. Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines, Methodology: 2019 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 19, 2018, 9:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-

graduate-schools/articles/law-schools-methodology. While the changing U.S. News methodology
weighting is likely to be an important determinant of a law school's U.S. News rank, a chronicling
of these changes is beyond the scope of this study; instead, this study principally considers the
methodology employed in calendar years 2014 through 2018, which corresponds with rankings
for 2015 and 2019 respectively.
I1. Eg., Id.
12. See Arewa et al., supra note 7, at 993; Andrew P. Morriss & William D. Henderson,
MeasuringOutcomes: Post-GraduationMeasures ofSuccess in the U.S. News & World Report

Law School Rankings, 83 IND. L.J. 791, 794 (2008).
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context of law school rankings as the "Echo Chamber"' 3 or "Echo
Effect."' 4 Adherents to the Echo Effect theory posit that the rise or fall of
a law school's position in the overall U.S. News rankings in one year
impacts that school's academic reputation score the following year
because legal academics take notice of the school's rise or fall in the
rankings and then are influenced to view that school more positively or
negatively.' 5

This effect is demonstrable.' 6 Using recent peer review score data, sixyear lagged data from 2008 correlates with 2014 peer review scores at an
astounding 0.948 rate-and peer review scores from each year since 2009
correlate with 2014 peer review scores at a 0.986 rate or greater.' 7
Table 1: Peer Review Score Correlations by Yearly Lags

PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR
PR

score 2014
score 2013
score 2012
score 2011
score 2010
score 2009
score 2008

PR Score
2014
1.000
0.994
0.991
0.988
0.988
0.986
0.948

PR Score
2013

PR Score
2012

PR Score
2011

PR Score
2010

PR Score
2009

PR Score
2008

1.000
0.991
0.988
0.987
0.985
0.943

LOOD
0,993
0.992
0.987
0-947

L000
0.995
0.990
0.948

1000
0.992
0.952

L000
0.954

1000

Whether inputs or outputs, measures of quality and value or not, no
covariate is as correlated with a law school's current year peer review
rank as its previous year peer review score. The degree of correlation
between current year peer review score and previous year peer review
score is perhaps the most damning indictment on the peer review ranking
system of all, as the time-invariance of peer reviews hurts the ability of'
13. See Leiter, supra note 5, at 51 ("[Olne of the many deficiencies of U.S. News is that its
reputational surveys of academics are so poorly conducted that they have simply become echo
chambers of the prior year's U.S. News ranking.").
14. Stake, supranote 6, at 250.
15. Jones, supra note 7, at 759; see also Wendy N. Espeland & Michael Sauder, Rankings
and Reactivity: How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds, AM. J. Soc., July 2007, at 1, 1314 (explaining that prior rankings influence current evaluations).
16. Not only is this relationship demonstrated by Table 1, but Table A2, in the appendix,
uses regression to predict peer review scores from prior year lagged peer review scores. In Table
A2, the relationship between current year peer review scores and prior year scores is also
demonstrably strong.
17. The data demonstrated below were assigned yearly values for the year in which the
ranking was issued. As such, 2008 peer review scores were released in that calendar year, despite

being titled by the publication as the "2009" rankings. Using more recent data, which is not
publicly available, the correlation is shown to be even stronger and longer lasting, tracking U.S.
News' rankings between the calendar years of 1992 and 2017. See Robert Anderson, Predicting
the Future of U.S. News Law School Rankings with Revealed Preference Rankings?,
WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, & DATA (Sept. 12, 2017, 8:34 PM), http://witnesseth.typepad.com/
blog/2017/09/predicting-the-future-of-us-news-with-revealed-preference-rankings.html.
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the rankings to adjust to modern concerns about the value of legal
education.
B. Alternative Ranking Systems ofLaw Schools
Good ranking tstems help consumers of information determine
quality and value.' For example, prospective employers rely upon
educational rankings in directin their recruitment efforts to students
attending top-quality institutions. Current law students are interested in
law school rankings because of the signaling function that they serve to
these potential employers. 2 0 Perhaps more importantly, rankings can tell
potential law students not only where to go for law school but also which
law schools are best at matriculating the best law students.2 1
Alternatively, and more saliently, prospective law students-who may be
principally concerned with post-graduation outcomes-need a
mechanism to assess marginal costs and benefits associated with each
institution of legal education.22 Thus, echo effects between current and
prior year rankings, perpetuated either by stasis in peer review scores or
by overall rankings, would be highly problematic, not simply for the U.S.
News ranking system, but for all of legal education. This is because it
would evince a failure of the market to provide potential and actual
stakeholders with a reliable measure of institutional quality and value,
which would change year to year.
To date, academe has been critical of, but apart from a couple of
exceptions, has not proffered workable alternatives to the US. News
rankings.23 In the legal academy, Ryan and Frye provide a unique

18. Korobkin, supra note 5, at 40; see also Caron & Gely, supra note 5, at 1515-17

(explaining that rankings provide convenient access to useful information).
19. Morriss & Henderson, supra note 12, at 795; see also George & Yoon, supra note 3, at

6 (explaining that law schools often focus their recruitment efforts for law professors on
candidates who attended elite law schools); Bernard A. Burk, What's New aboutthe New Normal:
The Evolving Market for New Lawyers in the 21st Century, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 576
(2014); Joe G. Baker & Brian K. Jorgensen, Leaving the Law: Occupationaland CareerMobility
of Law School Graduates,J. LEGAL EDUC., Mar. 2000, at 16, Redding, supra note 3, at 594, 596,

599, 604-05 (concluding that law schools typically hire candidates who attended elite law
schools); Stake, supra note 6, at 260, 264.
20. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, Some Students Want Their Deans Fired After PoorShowing in
the U.S. News Rankings (And One Head That's Already Rolled), ABOVE THE L. (Mar. 14, 2013,

11:20 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/03/some-students-want-their-deans-fired-after-poorshowing-in-the-u-s-news-rankings-and-one-head-thats-already-rolled/.
21. Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian L. Frye, A Revealed-Preferences Ranking of Law

Schools, 69 ALA. L. REv. 495, 502 (2017).
22. Morriss & Henderson, supra note 12, at 795.
23. See David D. Dill & Maarja Soo, Academic Quality, League Tables, and Public Policy:
A Cross-NationalAnalysis of University Ranking Systems, 49 HIGHER EDUC. 495, 525 (2005);
Stephen D. Grunig, Research, Reputation, and Resources: The Effect of Research Activity on

A VALUN-ADDED RANKING OFLAWSCHOOLS

2019]1

291

alternative ranking of law schools, known as the revealed-preferences
ranking, which answers not where students should attend but where the
best law students actually attend. 24 Other legal scholars-starting with
Leiter, and later, Black and Caron, as well as Yelnosky, et al., have
attempted to rank law schools on the basis of faculty productivity. 2 5
While these alternative rankings are useful, faculty productivity rankings
are likely more salient to academics than to prospective law students, and
the revealed preferences rankings are salient to prospective law students
insofar as they compare law schools on the entering credentials of their
students but do not give a complete picture of how the law school
prepares those students for careers in the law. More than half of law
students surveyed this academic year indicated that, among the most
salient factors to them, bar passage and employment opportunities matter
most to their decision to attend law school. As such, a rankings system
that considers these outcomes in terms of the inputs, or entering
credentials of a law school cohort, is necessary to describe a law school's
value as the value that law schools add to their students.
C. Applicationsfrom the Higher EducationLiterature
Like law school rankings, the major higher education ranking systems
utilize input measures, including the quality of students, as well as
reputational measures, which can be imprecise. 2 7 However, approaches
to analyzing rankings outside of the legal academy have identified the
primary proxies for academic quality. Most commonly used in K-12
literature, value-added modeling measures a contribution of a school in a
given year by comparing the current test scores of students to the scores
Perceptionsof UndergraduateEducation and Institutional Resource Acquisition, 68 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 17, 45 (1997).
24. See Ryan & Frye, supra note 21, at 503, 506. See also Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian
L. Frye, The 2019 Revealed-PreferencesRanking of Law Schools, 7 BELMONT L. REV. 86-110

(2019).
25. See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 5, at 50; Black & Caron, supra note 5, at 83-136 (proffering
an alternate ranking mechanism-using a measurement of a law faculty's Social Science Research
Network (SSRN) scholarship output to substitute for the law school's peer assessment score);
Michael J. Yelnosky, Comment to On "Faculty Productivity" Studies, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS
NETWORK: BRIAN LETTER'S L. SCH. REP. (May 7, 2012, 4:48 PM), https://leiterlawschool.
typepad.com/leiter/2012/05/on-faculty-productivity-studies.html.
26. At the private elite law school, 81.29% of law students surveyed indicated that job
placement was a factor of greatest consideration in enrolling in their current law school, and
60.71% responded that career opportunities were among the most salient considerations for them.
At the public flagship, 56.76% and 56.4 1% of respondents indicated that career opportunities and
bar passage were among the top three considerations for them, respectively. For the public
regional, these same factors earned 79.69% and 67.21%, respectively. And finally, at the private
new law school, 90.91% of students surveyed indicated that bar passage was the most salient
factor for them.

27. Dill & Soo, supra note 23, at 504.
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of those same students in a prior year, as well as the students' peers, in
order to isolate the effect, or value-added, for which each school is
responsible in a given year, relative to the performance measures of other
schools.2 8
Recently, scholars have begun to contemplate the application of
value-added in the higher education sector.2 9 The literature on the value
of higher education relies heavily on the education production function,
which relates inputs, such as students' characteristics, to measured
educational outputs, such as standardized test scores, persistence and
graduation, and labor market success. 3 0 The link between inputs to legal
education and outcomes, such as the labor market, is not a foreign concept
in the context of law schools. Recently, a small but growing body of
literature has begun to apply this framework to legal education.31 TilS
study will employ a value-added analysis, maybe for the first time ever,
to the context of legal education, using econometric methods to address
the relationship among legal education, law students, and the legal
profession.32 Importantly, apart from one notable ranking system that
28. See, e.g., Derek C. Briggs, Making Value-Added Inferences from Large-Scale
Assessments, in IMPROVING LARGE-SCALE ASSESSMENT IN EDUCATION: THEORY, ISSUES, AND

PRACTICE 186, 188 (Marielle Simon et al. eds., 2013); Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman & Jonah E.
Rockoff, The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in

Adulthood 50 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17699, 2011); Dale Ballou,
William Sanders & Paul Wright, Controllingfor Student Backgroundin Value-Added Assessment
of Teachers, 29 J. EDUC. & BEHAV. STAT. 37, 60-61 (2004).
29. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, A Value-Added Perspective on Higher Education, 7 UC
IRVINE L. REV. 123, 131 (2017).
30. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966)

(performing the first major study to use an educational production function theoretical
framework); Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in Humans, Technological
Difusion, and Economic Growth, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 69, 75 (1966) (applying the education

production function and economic growth theories to higher education in the United States);
Edward Lazear, Education: Consumption or Production?,85 J. POL. ECON. 569, 594 (1977).
31. See, e.g., SANDY BAUM, A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT LAW SCHOOL

AFFORDABILITY 2 (AccessLex Institute ed., 2015); Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The
Economic Value ofa Law Degree, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 284-85 (2014) (using Bureau of Labor

Statistics to compare lifetime earnings of bachelor's and law degree recipients and finding that,
for most law school graduates, there exists a significant earning premium for graduates of law
school over their bachelor's degree earning peers); Frank McIntyre & Michael Simkovic, Value
ofa Law Degree by College Major 13-14 (AccessLex Institute, Research Paper No. 16-03, 2016)
(finding that law degree earnings premiums are highest for humanities and social sciences majors
and lowest for STEM majors).
32. This study links the aforementioned literature on rankings with the literature on the

quantifiable outcomes of legal education, building on qualitative and quantitative research in this
area. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A

LAWYER" 39 (2007) (focusing on the language of law schools, how legal education is developed
and reproduced over time, and how this impacts law students and the profession). The need for

greater use of qualitative methods in research on legal education has been noted by legal
academics. See Alyson M. Drake, The Need for Experiential Legal Research Education, 108 L.
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focuses on post-graduate outcomes but only ranks about one quarter of
the population of law schools, 3 3 this Article offers a novel contribution to
the literature by ranking almost the entire population of American law
schools on the basis of their students' post-graduate outcomes,
controlling for the same students' entering credentials.
II. MEASURING VALUE

A. PrimaryResearch Question
In suggesting a ranking of law schools based on their students' postgraduate outcomes, taking into account those same students' quantifiable
inputs upon entry to law school, this Article examines value as signaled
by national law school rankings. 34 A reliable indicator of quality and
value is a vital asset for prospective consumers and participants in any
market, especially the current legal education market. Thus, this study
examines the following research question:

LIB. J. 511, 514 (2016). See also Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth & Joyce S. Sterling, Buyers'
Remorse?: An Empirical Assessment of the Desirabilityof a Lawyer Career, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC.

211, 215 (2013) (discussing empirically the appeal of a career in law to since the Recession);
Robert L. Nelson et al., Observationsfrom the After the Bar Survey of the Bar Class of 2000, 24
QUINNIPAC L. REv. 539, 539 (2006) (describing early results from the first wave of respondents).
Using this approach, a few researchers have developed one-off studies with new samples that
consider the same kinds of questions as the After the JD survey. E.g., Deborah J. Merritt, What
Happened to the Class of 2010?: Empirical Evidence of Structural Change in the Legal
Profession, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1045-46 (2015) (using publicly available sources to
compile a national sample, this study offers an empirical survey of early career outcomes for the
Class of 2010); Atinuke 0. Adediran et al., Making the Best ofa Bad Beginning: Young New York
Lawyers Confronting the Great Recession, LSAC Grants Reports No. 16-01, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2747419 (2016) (employing survey data
and 31 interviews, this study sheds light on the experiences of lawyers admitted to the New York
state bar and practicing in the New York metropolitan area during the Recession).
33. See 2017 Top 50 Law Schools, ABOVE THE L., https://abovethelaw.com/law-schoolrankings/top-law-schools/.
34. While several alternative rankings have begun to gain traction in recent years, the U.S.
News & World Report ranking has become the "gold standard of the ranking business," as well as
a proxy for determining a law school's quality and value. Arewa et al., supra note 7, at 984;
Critchlow, supra note 7, at 1323; Ehrenberg, supra note 6, at 145-62. However, forty percent of

the methodology for the overall ranking of a law school depends upon virtually time-invariant
peer reputational scores by judges, attorneys, and law professors. See Morse & Hines, supra note
10. Thus, these rankings can hardly be said to represent a law school's value to a potential
consumer. Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., A Value-Added Ranking of Law Schools 5-6 (AccessLex
Institute, Research Paper No.18-05, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2623728 (noting the problematic time-invariance of peer review ratings and arguing for a
value-added approach to ranking law schools); Ryan & Frye, supra note 21, at 506 (establishing
an alternative ranking system that does not rely on peer review at all but a consumer-based
argument for ranking law schools).
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Controllingfor differences between and within institutions,
to what extent do indicators of a law school'sperformance
exceed or fall short of its predictedperformancefor a given
cohort of law students?
B. Data
This study makes use of publicly available ABA data including the
Rule 509 Required Disclosures, 35 Employment, 36 and Bar Passage data, 37
covering a vast array of institution-reported data from each of the fully
ABA-accredited law schools, including: admissions selectivity; enteringclass median GPA; entering class median LSAT; degrees awarded; bar
passage rate; and modal state jurisdiction bar passage rate. This data,
intended for consumer use and public transparency, is required to be
furnished annually to the ABA as a condition of a law school's
accreditation and is made publicly available by the ABA. This study
examines only the cohort that entered law school in 2014, because the bar
passage and employment data for this cohort became publicly available
in late March 2018, when this Article was drafted. Given the three-year
duration in the standard course of study in law school, using ABA data
from 2014 through 2017 provides an optimal way of comparing law
school institutional inputs in the cohort's incoming year (e.g., 2014) and
35. The ABA Standard 509 Required Disclosure reports list the latest data, based on fall
2017 numbers, and are available at: http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org. However, this study

used 2014 ABA Standard 509 Required Disclosure reported data in constructing the rankings to
discern the effect of attending a given law school based on the outcomes of the cohort that entered

law school in 2014.
36. This article employs the latest employment data on the Class of 2017 to accurately

measure their outcomes. An earlier draft of this article, posted to SSRN, used ABA employment
data reported in 2017 for the Class of 2016 cohort as a stand-in until the ABA Employment data
for the Class of 2017 were released mid-year in 2018. The reason the earlier draft used 2016 data
instead of 2017 data in the earlier draft is that the employment rates for bar passage required or
JD-advantage jobs have been very stable over the last five years, which provides an inference that

the rankings should not change much, if at all, when the 2017 employment data is made available.
2017 Legal Education Data Deck: Key Trends on Access, Affordability and Value, ACCESSLEX

INSTITUTE, 1, 26 (2017), https://www.accesslex.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/2017%2OLegal%
20Education%2OData%2Deck-4 14_17.pdf [hereinafter Legal EducationData Deck]. In 2011,
graduates entered bar-passage-required jobs at a rate of 65% and J.D.-advantage jobs at a rate of
13%. These figures were largely stable over the next four years: 64% bar-passage-required and

13% J.D. advantage in 2012; 64% bar-passage-required and 14% J.D. advantage in 2013; 66%
bar-passage-required and 15% J.D. advantage in 2014; and 67% bar-passage-required and 14%
J.D. advantage in 2015. However, as this article uses the most recent data, the reader can be sure
that the links being made between the inputs and outcomes for the Class of 2017 cohort are in fact
accurate.

37. The 2017 ABA Bar Passage data were released in late March 2018, separate from the
509 Disclosure Reports, which were released in December 2017, and are available at:
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal

o_the_bar/Questionnaires/2018_bar passagedata.xlsx.

educationandadmissions t
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comparing these inputs with the same cohort's outputs three years later
(e.g., 2017).38
C. PrimaryAnalytic Strategy
This study considers a value-added measure of law school success
based on the education production function. Relying on the publicly
available data from the ABA Employment, Bar Passage, and Rule 509
Disclosure Reports, the key dependent variables in this analysis are: bar
passage rate and the 9-month employment rates for bar-passage required
jobs and J.D. advantage jobs. Key independent variables include student
qualifications at entry-such as 75th, median, and 25th percentile
measures of entering students' LSAT scores and undergraduate GPAto determine the value that law schools create for their graduates upon
entry to the profession, conditional on the inputs of those students at entry
into law school.
Like other value-added modeling methods, this study utilizes a threestep process to assign a predicted and actual performance index to each
accredited law school. 39 First, a law school is assigned a post-graduate
outcome performance index for a given year (i.e., 2017) comprised of a
composite of standardized bar passage differentials from the top two
jurisdictions for which graduates sat for the bar exam, as well as a
standardized nine-month employment percentage, drawn from barpassage-required and J.D.-advantage jobs only. 40 Second, the
performance index is regressed on student characteristics-the 75th,
38. Again, while the bar passage rates were calculated from 2017 bar passage data, the
employment rates came from the most recently reported data, which are from 2016. As such, this
is a slightly imperfect analysis of the cohort trend, but because employment rates in the barpassage-required and J.D.-advantage jobs have been remarkably stable of the last five years, it is
unlikely that the actual outcome performance indices would vary much from their present rate.
See Legal Education Data Deck, supranote 36, at 26.
39. Ironically, this process is not dissimilar to the method U.S. News uses to assign a
performance index for its "Best High Schools." See Identifying Top-Performing Public High
Schools for the "Best High Schools" Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (2017),
http://www.usnews.com/pubfiles/best-high-schools-technical-appendix.pdf.
40. In the event a law school only reported one bar jurisdiction's bar passage, the
standardized difference between the law school's bar passage rate in a given jurisdiction from that
jurisdiction's average bar passage rate served as the component measure of bar passage. For law
schools that reported bar passage rates from multiple jurisdictions, the difference between the law
school's bar passage rate and state average bar passage rates for the top two most popular
jurisdictions was averaged and then standardized to serve as the component measure of bar
passage. Next, the performance index's component measure of employment was taken from the
bar-passage-required job rate and the J.D.-advantage job rate categories, as these categories
represent careers in or adjacent to law. These rates were summed and standardized for form the
component measure of employment. The component measures of bar passage and employment
were each assigned one-half weight and summed to create the law school's overall performance
index.
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median, and 25th percentile measures of LSAT scores and GPA-from
three years prior (i.e., 2014), in order to assess a complete cohort effect,
from entry to law school to post-graduate outcomes. Last, to provide the
value-added measure, a regression line is fitted to the performance index
data points, based on predicted performance indices and the residual
value, or difference, between the actual performance index for a law
school in a given year and its predicted performance index. 4 1
This analysis highlights the value law schools add to their students via
measurable improvements of their success on the bar exam and success
in job placement in the legal labor market. The objective of this threestep method is to identify law schools that have succeeded in preparing
their students for the practice of law as measured by bar passage
performance and nine-month employment rates, as well as to evaluate
how well law schools have prepared their students for these same
outcomes, given the predispositions of the students toward those outcome
measures.
41. See Figure 1, infra, demonstrating the predicted outcomes of the 2014-entering/2017graduating cohort. As a comparison, Figure 2 is offered as the actual post-graduate outcomes of
the 2014-entering/2017-graduating cohort. The difference between these two points is what is
measure by the value-added rankings.

42. 1 have been told that the textual explanation of my methodology is a bit heavy on the
statistics jargon. But because I like it and want to make it more accessible, I will utilize this
footnote to explain the methodology with an analogy and an illustration. Since Spring signals both
the onset of new-rankings fever as well as the Masters Tournament, please forgive the golf

analogy.
The methodology I use is something like an Arnold Palmer: part lemonade, part tea. The
fresh-squeezed lemonade component is quantifiable credentialing "inputs" of a cohort of law
students upon entry to law school-GPA and LSAT. Assume a law school's entering class has the
following scores and grades: a 162 75th percentile LSAT; 157 median LSAT; a 150 25th
percentile LSAT; a 3.7 75th percentile GPA; a 3.4 median GPA; and a 3.0 25th percentile GPA.
In the first step, my methodology nationally standardizes each score or grade by category; that is,
I assume that the data points from all schools follows a normal distribution (i.e., a bell curve) by
category and have my statistical analysis program, Stata, assign each school a "z-score" by
category, which scales the values in terms of standard deviations that plots them on the normal
distribution, or bell curve. I then weight each school's z-score by one sixth, signaling the number

of categories in the "inputs" index, and sum them for an averaged total composite "inputs" index.
From this standardized composite index, I predict how that same cohort, for each law school,
would be predicted to fare in terms of a hypothetical index of outcomes. Outcomes, the aged and
dried tea, are taken from bar passage differentials of the top two modal bar jurisdictions-an
average of which is eventually weighted by one half total-and employment percentages for barpassage-required and J.D.-advantage jobs, which are summed and eventually weighted by one
half total. Assume the following for the computation of the bar passage differential: if a law school
has a bar passage rate in jurisdiction X of 84% and jurisdiction X's state average is 78%, the law
school has a bar passage differential rate of 6%. This number would be averaged with the law
school's bar passage differential in jurisdiction Y, if the law school had 10 or more bar examinees
in jurisdiction Y. For employment percentages, I sum the percent of students working in bar-

passage-required and JD-advantage jobs; in other words, this portion of the "outcomes" index
signals the rate of graduates employed in jobs that require legal training for a given law school.
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III. RESULTS AND DiSCUSSION
A law school's value-added measure represents the outcomes-based
movement-in standard deviations-from where the law school was
predicted to be to the space it actually occupies, given the characteristics
of its students before they began their legal studies. The value-added
measure is equivalent to the effect of attending the law school, controlling
for institutional differences and student characteristics, and provides a
more informative measure than any other alternative measure of whether
a law school's performance exceeds or falls short of its predicted
performance.
As a comparison, Figure 1, below, indicates the predicted postgraduate outcomes (standardized bar passage and law employment index)
from the 2014-entering cohort's credentials. Figure 2, by contrast, plots
the actual, or observed, post-graduate outcomes of the same cohort. The
difference between the two graphs accounts for the measure of the value
added. Notably, the distribution of predicted post-graduate outcomes is
fairly normalized around the fitted value line. However, the second
figure, plotting the actual value added of a law school exhibits a bimodal
distribution, with many schools that are not highly rated by peer review
exceeding their expected post-graduate outcome metrics. Moreover, the
many schools occupying the middle, by peer review score, in Figure 1
underperform expectation on a standardized scale, as indicated by the
depression in the middle of Figure 2.

Assume that a law school has 64% of its graduates in bar-passage-required jobs and 12% in JDadvantage jobs for a total of 76% in law-related jobs. This sum and the bar passage differential
average are then standardized, weighted by 1/2, and summed for a total composite "outcomes"
index. My ranking compares how law schools actually perform on the outcomes index, given the
inputs index, compared with how they could be predicted to perform on the outcomes index, based
only on the inputs index. The punch line: I assess the difference in how the Arnold Palmer actually
tastes, taking into consideration the quality of the lemons, as compared to how we think the Arnold
Palmer would taste, based only on looking at the lemons.

298

UNIVERSI7Y OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF I.AW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 29

C,

-

Figure 1: Value-added Scatterplot by Predicted Outcome
Performance Index for 2017 Graduating Cohort
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Figure 2: Value-added Scatterplot by Actual Outcome
Performance Index for 2017 Graduating Cohort

,

V

00081aa

0
'
00

0

0

00 0~ 0~c.c

~

I~o

1

2

3
US NEWS Peer Review Score
-

> 0.68 Standard Deviation
o 0.33 to 0.49 Standard Deviations
0.02 to 0.15 Standard Deviations
* <-0.25 Standard Deviations
*

*
C
0

4

5

Fitted values
0.5 to 0.67 Standard Deviations
0.16 to 0.325 Standard Deviations
-0.25 to 0.01 Standard Deviations

2019)

A VALUE-ADDEgD RANKING OF LAW SCHOOLS

299

The law schools in the value-added rankings sample are ranked by the
difference between the law school's actual performance index and its
predicted performance index in standard deviations. 4 3 The difference
between the actual and predicted performance index for a law school is,
in essence, the effect of attending that law school. This study proffers
these results as a ranking, without significant commentary, in the
appendix for the reader's consideration. Importantly, this ranking
contributes something truly unique to the rankings literature in that it
assigns a value only to that for which the law school can be said to add
value (i.e., bar passage and employment prospects), and not those
indicators specific to the student for which a law school was not
responsible or cherry-picked to improve standing in the US. News
rankings (i.e., LSAT and GPA scores).
A few additional observations about these value-added results warrant
mention, namely: (1) by ranking by effect size, it is clear that a number
of the law schools that are traditionally well-favored by reputational peer
review fare well under this methodology (e.g., Yale, Stanford, Harvard,
Chicago, Virginia, Columbia, Penn, Duke, NYU, Cal-Berkeley, UCLA,
Michigan, Northwestern, etc., all of which remain in the top 20 law
schools); (2) several schools that are not historically well-favored by
reputational peer review tend not to fare so well under this methodology,
too (e.g., Liberty, Ohio Northern, North Dakota, Campbell, Memphis,
Regent, Mercer, etc.); (3) however, many schools that may be regarded
as merely middling or worse are in fact vastly out-performing their
expected stations (e.g., Southern, Florida Coastal, Appalachian, La
Verne, John Marshall - Atlanta, Ave Maria, Faulkner, Texas Southern,
UMass, Barry, Charleston, Florida A&M, etc.), while many wellregarded law schools dramatically underperformed (e.g., Connecticut,
Washington & Lee, Illinois, Florida State, Florida, Richmond, Maryland,
etc., all of which fell from the top 50 law schools); (4) still, other middle-

43. In total, this study ranked 192 of 204 American law schools. Six law schools could not
be ranked because of incomplete data and the fact that they were also unranked by U.S. News.
Those schools include: Thomas Jefferson School of Law, Arizona Summit Law School, Inter
American University of Puerto Rico, University of Puerto Rico, Pontifical Catholic University of
Puerto Rico, and the University of the District of Columbia. Three law schools also had
incomplete data and could not be ranked because they were too new to the dataset. Those schools
include: Lincoln Memorial University, University of North Texas - Dallas, and Concordia
University. Additionally, three law schools were dropped from the dataset because they closed
during the data timeline, including: Whittier Law School, Charlotte Law School, and Indiana Tech
Law School. Because Penn State reported in the aggregate in 2014, its result aggregates the
Dickinson and College Park campuses and does not separate them as they are reported in the 2017
data. Conversely, although Rutgers-Camden and Rutgers-Newark reported separate statistics in
2014, the statistics for the individual law schools were aggregated, given that Rutgers now reports

their disclosures in the aggregate.
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tier schools fell far short of their reputation (e.g., Pepperdine," CalHastings, Rutgers, Michigan State, South Carolina, Denver, Louisiana
State, etc., all of which dropped to the very back of the pack) while other
schools typically considered in the penultimate tier significantly
outperformed expectation (e.g., Suffolk, Northern Illinois, Dayton, Roger
Williams, Widener - Delaware, St. Mary's, and South Dakota).
CONCLUSION

Reliable indicators of quality and value are essential to inform market
participants' expectations, but they should be responsive enough to
changes in quality and value that they do not become synonymous with
participants' expectations. This study builds on earlier findings to
confirm that peer review scores are bound up with prior rankings,
illustrating the very high degree to which the current year peer review
scores can, to an overwhelming degree, be explained by prior year peer
review scores, and by comparison, rely very little on the specific
attributes of a law school that change from year to year and should be
considered in a law school's reputational score.
Considering that the peer review ranking system employed by U.S.
News is dyssynchronous with the changing features of law schools, the
performance index model seems uniquely positioned to address
organizational performance more effectively than any alternative
measure of a law school's value to date. It is hoped that alternative
metrics, such as the value-added model suggested by this Article, help to
eventually supplant reliance on reputational peer review, which measures
quality and value imprecisely, time-invariantly, or using only inputs
rather than the outputs for which a law school is directly responsible.
This study demonstrates the benefits of gauging the value that law
schools actually provide their students and assessing law schools based
on this value. The principal contribution of this study is to provide the
first ever use of value-added measures to rank law schools, based on the
students they admit. In essence, this value-added ranking measures the
effect of attending a given law school.4 5 This ranking system informs the
44. Since Pepperdine was unranked by U.S. News & World Report in its latest rankings,
"due to a reporting error by the school," the school's U.S. News ranking is based on what three
ranking experts would have expected Pepperdine's position to be if the school had not been
penalized by the publication for noting a mistake in its (Pepperdine's) reporting. See Paul Caron,
Pepperdine's Place in the 2019 U.S. News Rankings, L. PROFESSOR BLOGs NETWORK:

TAXPROFBLOG (Mar. 16, 2018), http://taxproftypepad.com/taxprof blog/2018/03/pepperdinesplace-in-the-2019-us-news-rankings.html.

45. Finally, it should be noted that this index is based on, in effect, what law schools do
with the students they matriculate. Thus, the index-like all value-added indices-is favorable to
the schools who take highly credentialed students and exceed expectations with them, but it is
especially favorable to schools that matriculate students with the very lowest credentials and
exceed expectations with them.
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discussion about value that law schools add to their students' postgraduate outcomes and is thus an ideal metric of a law school's value to
its potential and current students.
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APPENDIX

Table Al: Value-Added Law School Rankings
V.A.

U.S News

V.A. vs.

V.A.

Rank

U.S News

Index

(03.2018)

Rank

Rank

Law School Name

I

YALE UNIVERSITY

1.98655

2

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

1.901242

3

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

1.877324

4

CHICAGO, UNIVERSITY OF

1.775276

5

SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER

1.571606

6

FLORIDA COASTAL SCHOOL OF LAW

1.534933

7

APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW

1.522974

8

LA VERNE, UNIVERSITY OF

1.515799

9

VIRGINIA, UNIVERSITY OF

1.512181

10

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1.508195

II

PENNSYLVANIA, UNIVERSITY OF

1.487466

12

DUKE UNIVERSITY

1.461954

13

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

1.453981

14

CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY, UNIVERSITY OF

1.42528

15

CALIFORNIA-LOS ANGELES, UNIVERSITY OF

1.344757

16

MICHIGAN, UNIVERSITY OF

1.313664

17

JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - ATLANTA

1.268649

18

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

1.260247

19

AVE MARIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1.247921

20

FAULKNER UNIVERSITY

1245529

21

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF

1.23952

22

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

1.228358

23

TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY

1.216828

24

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

1.206035

25

MASSACHUSETTS-DARTMOUTH, UNIVERSITY OF

1.205667

26

BARRY UNIVERSITY

1.174574

27

CHARLESTON SCHOOL OF LAW

1.168195

28

VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

1.12631

29

FLORIDA A&M SCHOOL OF LAW

1.115576

30

TEXAS-AUSTIN, UNIVERSITY OF

1.099202

31

ELON UNIVERSITY

1.096441

32

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY

1.095645

33

WILLIAM & MARY, COLLEGE OF

1.092824
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34

ST. THOMAS UNIVERSITY (FL)

1.083686

150

112

35

TOUROCOLLEGE

1.081294

150

111

36

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY

1.078903

150

110

37

WASHINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF

1.03622

32

-9

38

ST. MARY'S UNIVERSITY

1.007946

150

108

39

MINNESOTA, UNIVERSITY OF

1.002734

20

-23

40

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

1.001937

24

-20

41

THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL

1.000771

150

105

42

ALABAMA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.9995451

27

-19

43

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY - CARBONDALE

0.9991763

150

103

44

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

0.9947619

41

-7

45

JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL - CHICAGO

0.9712727

150

101

46

SOUTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.9672871

128

78

47

WIDENER UNIVERSITY - HARRISBURG

0.9569221

150

99

48

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE OF LAW

0.9385858

150

98

49

EMORY UNIVERSITY

0.9341704

22

-31

50

NOTRE DAME, UNIVERSITY OF

0.8895234

24

-30
-23

51

GEORGIA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.8847402

32

52

DAYTON, UNIVERSITY OF

0.8668318

141

85

53

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

0.8608222

22

-35

54

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY

0.8604535

144

86

55

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

0.8588605

144

85

56

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND UNIVERSITY

0.8580619

150

90

57

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL UNIVERSITY

0.8556703

150

89

58

OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY

0.8437113

150

88

59

NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL OF LAW

0.8421172

150

87

60

ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY

0.8365355

150

86

61

WIDENER UNIVERSITY - WILMINGTON

0.8213894

143

78

62

WESTERN STATE COLLEGE OF LAW

0.8205909

150

84

63

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

0.811821

150

83

64

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

0.8002317

18

-50

65

IOWA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.7890702

27

-42
-38

66

INDIANA UNIVERSITY - BLOOMINGTON

0.7731246

32

67

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY

0.7703632

150

79

68

SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW

0.752027

150

78

69

IDAHO, UNIVERSITY OF

0.7320956

119

46

70

CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF

0.7284777

37

-37

71

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

0.7220994

27

-48
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72

CALIFORNIA WESTERN SCHOOL OF LAW

0.7081776

150

74

73

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

0.6973849

37

-40

74

CALIFORNIA-IRVINE, UNIVERSITY OF

0.6949933

21

-57

75

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

0.6854259

32

-47

76

TENNESSEE-KNOXVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF

0.6846294

65

-15

77

SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY

0.6790487

50

-31

78

WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

0.6774535

32

-50

79

COLORADO-BOULDER, UNIVERSITY OF

0.6615089

46

-37

80

WISCONSIN, UNIVERSITY OF

0.6487523

27

-57

81

NORTHERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY

0.645992

150

65

82

PACIFIC, UNIVERSITY OF THE

0.6284523

ISO

64

83

NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, UNIVERSITY OF

0.6264294

80

-7

84

DETROIT MERCY, UNIVERSITY OF

0.622074

150

62

85

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY - NEW ORLEANS

0.574239

150

61

86

BOSTON COLLEGE

0.569027

27

-63

87

SAMFORD UNIVERSITY

0.5654691

150

59

88

ALBANY LAW SCHOOL

0.5511185

106

14

89

VERMONT LAW SCHOOL

0.5495235

133

40

90

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL

0.536768

110

16

91

ARIZONA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.5323524

41

-54

92

GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

0.5275693

41

-55

93

UTAH, UNIVERSITY OF

0.5012597

54

-43

94

NORTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.4980716

45

-53

95

PENN STATE UNIVERSITY - DICKINSON LAW

0.4821258

59

-40

96

SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL

0.4817571

150

50

97

SAN FRANCISCO, UNIVERSITY OF

0.4769729

150

49

98

WILLAMETTEUNIVERSITY

0.4761764

150

48

99

PACE UNIVERSITY

0.4737848

125

22

100

TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY

0.4650149

80

-24

101

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

0.461397

50

-55

102

YESHIVA UNIVERSITY

0.4606005

56

-50

103

MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY, UNIVERSITY OF

0.4458801

119

12

104

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY

0.4454523

59

-49

105

SAN DIEGO, UNIVERSITY OF

0.4239259

95

-14

106

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

0.4231294

47

-63

107

DRAKE UNIVERSITY

0.4171789

133

22

108

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

0.4111694

74

-38

109

MITCHELL-HAMLINE

0.4096059

150

37
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110

CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY

0.3916678

125

11

111

TOLEDO, UNIVERSITY OF

03860861

137

22
-51

112

VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY

03840632

65

113

BALTIMORE, UNIVERSITY OF

0382898

119

2

114

MARYLAND, UNIVERSITY OF

03808741

49

-69

115

FLORIDA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.3649284

41

-78
-57

116

OKLAHOMA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.3585512

63

117

WASHBURNUNIVERSITY

0.3541968

119

-2

118

HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY

0.3502101

110

-12

119

HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF

0.3465922

56

-67

120

CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

0.3354307

65

-59

121

ILLINOIS, UNIVERSITY OF

0.3274584

37

-88

122

RICHMOND, UNIVERSITY OF

0.3266608

50

-76

123

GONZAGA UNIVERSITY

0.3191173

113

-14

124

ARKANSAS-LITTLE ROCK, UNIVERSITY OF

0.3087524

141

13

125

DEPAUL UNIVERSITY

0.3079558

128

-1

126

TULANE UNIVERSITY

0.3043379

54

-76

127

LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY

0.3035403

65

-66

128

FLORIDA INTL SCHOOL OF LAW

0,3003512

101

-31

129

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

0.2891898

47

-86

130

KANSAS, UNIVERSITY OF

0.2756367

74

-60
-22

131

CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY

0.2672946

113

132

ST. JOHN'S UNIVERSITY

0.2525162

83

-53

133

SEATTLE UNIVERSITY

0.2338102

128

-9

134

KENTUCKY, UNIVERSITY OF

0.2070728

65

-73
-74

135

MIAMI, UNIVERSITY OF

0.1895331

65

136

WASHINGTON & LEE UNIVERSITY

0.1895331

26

-114

137

INDIANA UNIVERSITY - INDIANAPOLIS

0.1891643

98

-43

138

MISSOURI-COLUMBIA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.187938

65

-77

139

NEVADA-LAS VEGAS, UNIVERSITY OF

0.1815597

59

-84

140

ST. LOUIS UNIVERSITY

0.1711958

98

-46

141

CINCINNATI, UNIVERSITY OF

0.1711958

65

-80

142

WYOMING, UNIVERSITY OF

0.1540849

133

-13

143

ARKANSAS-FAYETTEVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF

0.152062

88

-59

144

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

0.1512634

65

-83

145

PITTSBURGH, UNIVERSITY OF

0.1345223

74

-75
-65
-66

146

CHICAGO-KENT AT ILLINOIS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

0.1329272

85

147

NEW HAMPSHIRE, UNIVERSITY OF

0,128144

85
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148

QUINNIPIAC COLLEGE

0.1253837

133

-19

149

BROOKLYN LAW SCHOOL

0.1253837

83

-70

150

OREGON, UNIVERSITY OF

0.1221945

85

-69

151

MAINE, UNIVERSITY OF

0.0911007

106

-49

152

TULSA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.0890778

101

-55

153

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY -CHICAGO

0.0847234

74

-83

154

DENVER, UNIVERSITY OF

0.0827006

63

-95

155

BELMONT UNIVERSITY

0.0723367

139

-20

156

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY

0.06835

119

-41

157

HAWAH-MANOA, UNIVERSITY OF

0.0539994

101

-60

158

TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY

0.0516068

113

-49

159

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

0.0193487

80

-84

160

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

0.0157308

106

-59

161

ST. THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF (MN)

0.0057956

113

-53

162

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO

-0.0013802

106

-61

163

NEW MEXICO, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.001809

88

-80

164

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

-0.015362

88

-81

165

MONTANA, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.025727

119

-51

166

LOUISVILLE, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.0305102

113

-58

167

AKRON, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.0308789

144

-28

168

CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY

-0.0380537

139

-34

169

LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE

-0.0492151

95

-79

170

SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY

-0.0815343

113

-62

171

MISSISSIPPI, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.1249549

101

-75

172

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

-0.1397343

98

-79

173

CONNECTICUT, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.1823583

50

-128

174

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

-0.1907594

125

-54

175

CALIFORNIA-HASTINGS, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.2429488

58

-122

176

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY

-0.2593232

95

-86

177

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

-0.2660998

74

-108

178

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

-0.2792546

88

-95

179

DREXEL UNIVERSITY

-0.287227

101

-83

180

STETSON UNIVERSITY

-0.3039691

98

-87

181

SOUTH CAROLINA, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.311144

88

-98

182

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

-0.343403

88

-99

183

MERCER UNIVERSITY

-0.384492

128

-60

184

REGENT UNIVERSITY

-0.3884777

150

-39

185

MEMPHIS, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.4251522

137

-53
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186

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA

-0.4690016

110

-81

187

PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY

-0.4813283

64

-128

188

CAMPBELL UNIVERSITY

-0.4929186

150

-43

189

NORTH DAKOTA, UNIVERSITY OF

-0.5136475

150

-44

190

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

-0.5495235

128

-67

191

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY

-0.598156

150

-46

192

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY

-0.6428028

150

-47

Table A2: Regression Results of Yearly Law School Peer Review
Score Permanence

Table A2: Peer Review Score - Lag Score OLS Regression Results with Law School Fixed Effects
Four-Year
Three-Year
Two-Year
One-Year
Variables

1-Year Ing PR score

Log Model

Lag Model

Lag Model

Lag Model

0.545***
(0.0293)

0,435***
(0.0333)
0117***
(0.0372)

0382***
(0.0376)
0.188***
(0 0408)
0.0540
(0.0466)

1.1 12***
(0.0727)
1,329
0.234
195

0.837**(0o0}
1,134
0.238
195

0.901***
(0.151)
939
0.193
195

0.258***
(0.0442)
0.191***
(0.0475)
0.0835
(8.0539)
0.156***
(0.0570)
0734***
(0.232)
744
0.129
190

2-Year lag PR score
3-Year lag PR score
4-Year lag PR score
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of key

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p,<0.0 1, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

